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Abstract 
Although humour in prison is a widespread phenomenon, its meaning and function has not been 
examined in any detail. This article seeks to address this gap by analysing humour in prison-based 
cognitive behavioural programmes. The empirical data from fieldwork in three different programme 
settings illuminates how the participants actively disrupt and twist the power hierarchies by 
providing a kind of humorous meta-commentary on the simplicity and class bias of the course 
content. This article suggests that humour could be seen as a tool that enables prisoners to fend off 
the psychological and rhetorical power of the cognitive behavioural programmes, even if only 
briefly. By developing the concept of ‘soft resistance’ and analysing humour as friction and code-
switching, this article aims to illustrate and discuss the limits of soft power in prison-based 
therapeutic settings.    
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Introduction 
Humour is a seemingly trouble-free, upbeat and positive concept, and, simultaneously, a fuzzy-
edged phenomenon in terms of its content and form [1]. Previous research on humour often 
emphasizes the benevolent potentials of humour and laughter; humour can ‘defuse a potentially 
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tense situation’ (Meyer 2000: 312), improve health and well-being (McCreaddie and Wiggins 
2008), help gain control over a difficult situation (Ashforth and Kreiner 2002: 224; Pogrebin and 
Poole 1991: 401), function as a mature or high adaptive behavioural response at times of crises 
(Wright, Crewe and Hulley 2016) and relieve stress (Berlyne 1972; Morreall 1983). However, 
previous studies have also shown that many jokes deal with tendentious topics such as sex, 
aggression, and ethnic insult (Davies 1990; Fry 1963), while humour within school settings has 
been analysed as a technique utilized for the regulation of masculinity and negotiation of gender-
sexual hierarchies (Kehily and Nayak 1997: 70). Humour is, thus, a many-facetted concept with 
different uses and purposes; here, humour is interpreted as a tool to push back soft power in prison.  
 
The objective of this article is to examine the meanings of humour within cognitive behavioural 
programmes in prisons while connecting the empirical data to a broader discussion of penal power. 
While identification of resistance has become a widespread means of demonstrating prisoners’ 
agency (see Bosworth and Carrabine 2001; Ugelvik 2011) to a point where prisoners’ ‘[…] capacity 
for/act of resistance is now synonymous with agency’ (Rubin 2016: 4), this article suggests a 
different interpretive lens. Following Rubin’s critique of coining every subversive action as 
resistance, this article argues that the term friction is useful to discuss how the participants’ 
humorous behaviour is not necessarily resistance, but they are indeed frictional. Rubin suggests that 
we understand ‘friction as individuals’ actions that render power incomplete’ (Rubin 2015: 27), 
while she highlights that many acts of fighting back towards power are about ameliorating one’s 
own condition rather than undermining the prison regime. Similar to Rubin’s point, the participants’ 
jocular disruptions of the lessons are not necessarily politically inspired but, rather, they are small 
acts of creativity and subversion enacted as a response to being in a highly controlled environment 
while wishing to continue to live one’s life as one sees fit. Humour, then, is essentially a way of 
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sidestepping the many demands of cognitive self-change without getting into serious trouble. 
Hence, frictional behaviour, such as humorous disruptions and mocking jokes, could be viewed as 
‘windows of autonomous control’ (Rubin 2016: 3) that fend off soft power in prison. Importantly, 
prisoners’ frictional behaviour is located in the mismatch between their actions and the demands or 
expectations placed on them which means that ‘the prison regime shapes friction and resistance by 
forming the contours of the thing against which prisoners are reacting’ (Rubin 2016: 12). 
Scandinavian prison regimes are renowned for an emphasis on normalization, humane prison 
regimes and low incarceration rates relative to other Western countries (Pratt 2008). This penal field 
is particularly interesting because the relationships between staff and prisoners are often described 
as humane and positive, which carries important implications for the appearance, nature, reception, 
and the permitted humour. In general, Scandinavian prison practices seem to allow for larger 
amounts of explicit resistance or friction as long as it remains well meant, rational and eventually 
leads to compliance (Shammas 2014; Ugelvik 2011).  
 
The power exercised in this penal field, and particularly in cognitive behavioural programmes, is a 
certain type of psychological or ‘soft power’ (Crewe 2011) which corresponds to Foucauldian ideas 
about the ambiguous nature of power. According to Foucault, power is not suppressing in itself, but 
is exercised through the individual and through the way the individual is subjectified (Foucault 
1977). Furthermore, power produces resistance – in fact, discipline itself inspires insubordination 
(Fox 1999a: 94). However, Fox (1999a: 88) argues that prisoners’ resistance and objections are 
absorbed into and help sustain the cognitive behavioural programme’s discourse about criminality 
as essentially a choice and a result of faulty thought processes. Furthermore, she argues that the 
obligation to confess (and critically asses) one’s thoughts and actions are an important dimension of 
cognitive social control in cognitive behavioural programmes (Fox 1999a: 91).  
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Notwithstanding the value of the above analyses of power, this article calls into question whether 
we should assume that prisoners’ resistance (or friction) is completely absorbed by the cognitive 
behavioural programme’s rhetoric. I suggest that humour could be seen as a tool that enables 
prisoners to fend off the psychological and rhetorical power of the programmes, even if only 
briefly. Also, I propose that humour averts the confessionary gaze and thus provides leeway for the 
prisoners to avoid having to confess their inner thoughts. This analytical lens allows for an analysis 
of the way soft power in the shape of prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes operates. My 
findings call for a more nuanced interpretation of power because the participants actively disrupt 
and twist the power hierarchies in the cognitive behavioural programmes by providing a kind of 
meta-commentary on the simplicity and class bias of the course content.  In order to analyse the 
participants’ distinct counter-attacks to new forms of penal power, I propose an analytical fusion of 
the concepts of ‘resistance’ and ‘friction’ into the concept of ‘soft resistance’ [2]. Soft resistance is 
a useful concept when we seek to understand behaviours that do not undermine the prison regime, 
but creatively and subtly disrupts its rehabilitative projects and intentions. Soft resistance is, 
precisely like new types of penal power themselves, difficult for those who are subject to it to 
handle precisely because its form is ambiguous, non-coercive and multi-facetted. The exact same 
characteristics could be applied to humour, hence the presence of frictional humour results in soft 
resistance.    
 
The meanings of humour in general and in prison 
In general, theories about humour fall into three broad categories: superiority, relief, and 
incongruity theory [3] (Watson 2015: 409). This article understands humour as meta-
communicational processes (Rossel 1981: 196); thus, it revolves around the motivation that lies 
behind the use of humour and its social impact or function. Importantly, humour has the ability to 
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neutralize uncomfortable, but repeated experiences such as asymmetrical power relations and 
infantilizing situations. According to Billig, ‘whereas disciplinary humour mocks the powerless, 
rebellious humour can delight in taking the powerful as its target’ (Billig 2005: 208). Both 
disciplinary and rebellious humour should be understood in relation to social order. The social order 
is threatened or temporally overturned in Bakhtin’s (1981: 15) analysis of the carnival, which 
involved a temporary suspension of all social rules and etiquette. The ‘carnivalesque’ laughter is, 
therefore, a comic state of being that functions as a respite from official order and the everyday 
repression of the lower classes. Consequently, humour has the ability to turn hierarchies upside 
down and play with boundaries in a non-threatening manner. Douglas (1991: 104) argues that 
humour both connects and disorganizes, it attacks sense and hierarchies. This is in line with 
Bourdieu’s arguments about the quality of humour:  
 
The joke […] is the art of making fun without raising anger, by means of ritual 
mockery or insults which are neutralized by their very excess and which, 
presupposing a great familiarity, both in the knowledge they use and the freedom with 
which they use it, are in fact tokens of attention or affection, ways of building up 
while seeming to run down, of accepting while seeming to condemn … (Bourdieu 
1984: 183) 
 
Following Bourdieu’s line of reasoning, humour can function as a safety valve, a sort of sanctuary 
where one is allowed to say almost anything as long as the statement is followed by a disclaimer; it 
was just a joke (Fine and De Soucey 2005: 3). Thus, a joke can be seen as an attack upon something 
formal and organized, by something vital, and energetic; in essence, a joke is an attack upon 
controls (Douglas 1991: 95).   
6 
 
Meanings of humour in prisons 
A widespread use of humour has been observed in prisons (Crawley 2004; Goffman 1961; 
Kristoffersen 1986; Mathiesen 1965; Tracy et al. 2006), but there are only a few studies that 
explicitly focus on humour. These studies primarily show that humour is used to cope under 
difficult conditions in prison, both by staff members (Crawley 2004; Nylander et al. 2011), and 
prisoners (Geer 2002). Mathiesen (1965: 148) argues that humour is a crucial part of what he terms 
the ‘defences of the weak’ and may help to alleviate the pains of imprisonment. Thus, humour in 
prison may serve to release tensions, avoid aggression and to create an easier everyday life. 
Following Radcliffe-Brown (1952), Nielsen (2011) analyses the humorous interactions between 
prisoners and staff as ‘joking relationships’ and shows how officers and prisoners ‘play’ with power 
relations by way of switching roles and pretending that the prisoner rather than the officer is in 
charge. Furthermore, informal teasing, relaxed banter and ‘taking the mickey’ out of each other are 
seen as important tools for building better relationships between staff and prisoners. Indeed, 
cultivating relationships in which humour is used professionally is an imbedded aspect of ‘jailcraft’, 
which is developed over time and with experience (Liebling, Arnold and Straub 2011: 131). 
However, camaraderie and good-natured banter among staff does not always flow easily into staff–
prisoner relationships (Liebling, Arnold and Straub 2011: 130). The above studies show how the 
intrinsic ambiguity of humour and teasing allows staff members to engage in temporary breaches of 
social order, while simultaneously enforcing local rules of conduct.    
 
Cognitive behavioural programmes and soft power 
New rehabilitative attempts corresponding to the ‘What Works’ era of neoliberal rehabilitation were 
implemented in Danish Prisons in 1994 (Smith 2006) following the Canadian forerunners (Ross, 
Fabiano and Ewles 1988). Currently, seven different cognitive behavioural programmes are 
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available across the Danish Prison and Probation service [4]. The programmes were implemented 
because of their promised ability to reduce recidivism and improve the participants’ social and 
interpersonal skills. The Canadian programme developers (Ross, Fabiano and Ewles 1988) claim 
that ‘offenders’ are more likely to be impulsive, egocentric, rigid in their views, and poor at 
problem solving, perspective taking, and critical reasoning. The cognitive behavioural programmes 
focus on individual responsibility and expect participants to set their own standards for appropriate 
conduct through self-reflective analysis and assessment of the value of their own thoughts and 
behaviour (Sjöberg and Windfeldt 2008: 39). Activities in a session include role play, thinking 
games, dilemma puzzles and exercises in critical thinking (Ross and Fabiano 1988).  
Participation in cognitive behavioural programmes in Danish prisons is, in principal, voluntary. 
However, this could be termed as a ‘coerced voluntarism’ (Peyrot 1985) or ‘pressured 
rehabilitation’ (Day, Tucker and Howells 2004) since prisoners are rewarded an early release if they 
demonstrate a special effort (such as engaging in said programmes or drug treatment) to start afresh 
without crime (Nielsen 2012: 139). This coerced voluntarism adds an extra dimension to the 
subordination that prisoners undergo. Goffman (1961) famously gave a sensitive account of the 
mortification of self that inmates in a ‘total institution’ has to endure as their privacy is invaded, 
they are re-defined as a number and their old selves are insulted. If we relate these characteristics of 
the total institution to newer rehabilitative efforts, Fox’s work (1999a, 1999b) is beneficial. Fox 
examines the ‘production of forced selves’ in cognitive behavioural programmes in American 
prisons and the programme’s rhetorical construction of prisoners as particular ‘types’ of beings with 
a particular ‘criminal thinking’. Fox connects cognitive behavioural programmes to wider, neo-
liberal governmental power (see Miller and Rose 1994; Rose 1998 in which responsibility, self-
change and confession are important tools to create accountable and self-steering individuals. Fox 
(1999a: 97) shows how prisoners’ ‘sensibilities, decisions, feelings, and values’ are interpreted 
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through a powerful psychological language and become targets for evaluation, confession, and 
correction in cognitive self-change.  
Soft power 
As laid out above, cognitive behavioural programmes rest on a certain type of psychological or soft 
power. For Foucault, the prisoner is not regulated by ‘an exterior relation of power … but the 
individual is formed or, rather, formulated through his discursively constituted “identity” as 
prisoner’ (Butler 1997: 84). This type of capillary power reaches into individuals so deeply that it 
makes them who they are (Alford 2000: 125). This soft power in cognitive behavioural programmes 
rests upon a particular construction of abnormality, distorted thinking, and ‘antisocial’ behaviour 
and, thus, constitutes a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1982). Crewe (2011: 522) has examined soft 
power in present-day prisons in England. He argues that punishment, which is characterized by 
‘tightness’, operates in a manner that is ‘light’ but anonymous, and while it is not weighing down 
prisoners, it smothers them. This type of soft power is all-encompassing and invasive, because it 
promotes the self-regulation of all aspects of conduct. Such a power is prevalent in cognitive 
behavioural programmes, which assume the right to be highly intrusive and expect prisoners to 
expose their personal feelings and convictions in order to change these. The strive for cognitive 
self-change could be described as a ‘normative imperialism’ in which prisoners feel that the 
cognitive behavioural programmes are instructing them to be different kinds of persons – prototypes 
of responsible citizenship that could not survive the realities of life in the environments from which 
they are drawn (Crewe 2011). Crewe’s research does not focus on humour, but a statement from 
one of his informants links humour to soft power in prison: ‘I made a joke about sedating my 
girlfriend to take her on holiday [as part of a course scenario] – in the report they gave no context, 
said that my idea of getting someone on a plane was sedating them! I got knocked back, based on 
the psychologists’ reports’ (prisoner cited in Crewe 2011: 516). The example speaks volumes of the 
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difficulties in walking a tightrope between acceptable jokes and avoiding repercussions in the 
cognitive behavioural programmes. The example also illustrates the ‘tightness’ of psychological 
power; a seemingly innocent joke can affect prisoners prospects of release.  
Notwithstanding the value of the above analysis, the particular context of Danish prison regimes 
results in different consequences of a joke in cognitive behavioural programmes. In this context, the 
prisoners have much more leeway and more space to humorously mock the programme content, the 
instructor or themselves without any consequences for their ‘report’ or ‘personal file’. Hence, the 
participants in cognitive behavioural programmes in Danish prisons are able to use humour as a tool 
to fend off soft power from the onset. This calls for a critical examination of whether capillary 
power in the shape of cognitive behavioural programmes does reach so ‘deeply’ into individuals as 
we might presume.  
Data and methods 
The data analysed in this article is derived from fieldwork, individual and focus group interviews, 
and informal conversations with many different actors in the Danish Prison and Probation Service. I 
conducted around 150 hours of semi-ethnographic fieldwork (Stevens 2012) and 11 open-ended, 
semi-structured interviews in three Danish prisons settings: two maximum-security and one 
minimum-security prison. As I mainly draw on observational material, I will not go into detail about 
the interview material (see Author 2015; 2016). Besides the observational data, I draw on a research 
workshop that I conducted in an annual meeting for the cognitive behavioural programme 
instructors in the Danish Prison Service. I presented my initial findings on humour and asked the 12 
participating instructors to discuss the meanings of humour in small groups, and afterwards we 
discussed their findings in plenum. I recorded this discussion and transcribed it verbatim, as well as 
translated field notes and transcriptions from Danish into English. The prisons as well as all names 
of the participants and instructors have been anonymized to protect the identities of the individuals.  
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The fieldwork consisted of ‘moderate participation’ (Spradley 1980) in one Cognitive Skills 
programme and three different Anger Management programmes. The programmes consist of 38 
lessons and eight lessons, respectively, in which the participants go through lectures, group work, 
role play and exercises in critical thinking (Sjöberg and Windfeldt 2008). The observed 
programmes were group-based and consisted of four to six participants. Out of 24 participants in 
total, 13 had non-Danish backgrounds. The participants were all male and between 18 and 50 years 
old with a skew towards younger participants (41% were between 18 and 25 years of age). The 
instructors were all prison officers who had taken a three-week training course plus one year of 
supervision before they were certified as cognitive behavioural instructors.    
 
It is difficult to say whether the participants’ use of humour was exaggerated by my presence (as 
found in other studies; see Kehily and Nayak 1997: 78), but, in alignment with my impression, all 
of the instructors said that the participants seemed unaffected. Nevertheless, the presence of a 
relatively young, female researcher may have contributed to the jocular stories in the programmes. 
During the fieldwork, I often found myself struggling not to laugh when the participants cracked 
jokes or turned role play into comedy shows. Liebling (2001), following Becker (1967), argues that 
prison researchers must navigate the balance of ‘whose side to be on’, that is to say, staff or 
prisoners (or even between groups of prisoners). Ethnography entails deep enmeshment in the social 
realities of those studied, and a fine-tuned body and mind towards the social clues of the field 
(Hastrup 2004). Taking social clues means knowing or feeling when to laugh or not. I especially 
struggled to balance my loyalties towards the instructors and the participants whenever it felt 
inappropriate to laugh out of loyalty towards either party.  
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Findings 
The analysis unfolds through three distinct analytical agendas wherein I analyse a) humour as a 
contested topic, b) humour in the shape of soft resistance and code-switching, and c) humour as 
frictional behaviour. The conclusion opens up a discussion of the limits of soft power in cognitive 
behavioural programmes as well as in prison more generally. 
 
Humour as a contested topic 
This article interprets the participants’ humour as frictional behaviour and soft resistance. However, 
the instructors often describe the participants’ use of humour as a result of their alleged ‘cognitive 
distortions’. For example, the instructor Thomas explained that:  
 
I think that you can observe the participants’ lack of social skills and their missing 
ability to judge a situation imbedded in their use of humour. You’ve been asked to 
consider something that is painful or difficult and then you try to avoid it by using 
humour, being angry or trying to pinpoint a mistake in the programme curriculum.  
 
The power dynamics in the programmes as well as the instructors’ interpretation of humour as 
‘cognitive deficits’ make it more difficult to get the humour ‘right’ between the two parties, which 
enhances the risk of jokes falling flat. The instructor interprets the participants’ humour in 
psychological terms; as defence mechanisms or as attempts to avoid difficult topics whereas this 
article suggest that humour in the programmes is related to soft resistance and attempts to push back 
soft power. Nevertheless, the success of the instructors is very much dependent on the collaboration 
with the participants and tension arises whenever the instructor fails to accurately engage in 
humorous exchanges. The instructors are preoccupied with the complexities of balancing the use of 
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too much and too little humour. They seem to view humour as a social lubricant that creates flow in 
the social order in the groups and helps tackle difficult or unpleasant situations. I witnessed the 
playful interactions between the cognitive behavioural instructors and the participants on numerous 
occasions, as for instance on the first day of fieldwork in a maximum-security prison. When we 
arrived at the classroom, the instructor, Mohammad, experienced technical difficulties during the 
very first lesson. He was supposed to show the participants a video recording of their own role play, 
but the equipment failed. The participant, Kasper, then said mockingly ‘it’s fucked up that we can’t 
see the video’ and Mohammad replied ‘yeah, I also think it’s fucked up’. All of the participants 
teased Mohammad and one said: ‘we have come well prepared, so you should be as well’. This 
insult did not lead to any repercussions, but on the contrary seemed to set a light tone in the group. 
Perhaps Mohammad’s swearing and acknowledgments of his own failures helped to soften the 
otherwise hierarchical relationship between him and the prisoners. However, this example also 
highlights the potency of soft resistance in the shape of humour; the participants threw Mohammad 
of balance and ‘forced’ him to interact with them on their premises and in their mode language 
rather than the other way around. 
 
Attempts to establish trust in prisons can be difficult as they are in general low-trust environments 
and prisoners oftentimes have a deep-seated mistrust of authority figures (Liebling 2004). This is 
also the case in cognitive behavioural programmes where a rejection was on display when the 
instructor, Sussie, was joking around and used different names such as ‘sweetie’ for the participant, 
Omar. This was seemingly an attempt to humorously build report and trust between the two, but 
Omar did not seem to appreciate this and replied angrily: ‘what’s my name’? Omar and the 
instructor had a troubled relationship from the outset of the programme and Sussie’s humorous 
attempt to restore their relationship fell flat. My field notes also bear testament to the instructors’ 
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attempts to build bridges between themselves and the participants with another ethnic background 
than Danish by joking about their ethnicity. However, the following example shows how 
instructors’ attempts to bond with the participants can fall flat. The instructor in Anger 
Management, Mohammad, asked whether the participants had ever experienced peer pressure. 
Ahmad replied that he had indeed experienced the peer pressure of robbing a plumbing shop with 
toilets, sinks, etc. This story made the instructor Mohammad laugh out loud and exclaim: 
 
This has to end! I am so tired of hearing foreigners talking about small-scale tricks, 
like robbing old people’s homes or scamming a grocery store for petty things and then 
listening to ethnic Danes talking about their financial crime, large scale tax fraud and 
other white collar crimes!   
 
The instructor was obviously joking, but the participants did not seem amused by this story. They 
seemed to understand the joke well enough, but they did not participate in the instructor’s laughter 
and sat rather baffled and speechless. The participants rejected the invitation to create a ‘we-ness’ in 
this example by refusing to laugh at the instructor’s joke. Since joking is temporally immediate and 
calls for audience involvement, the absence of a response becomes a judgment on the teller and/or 
the remark (Fine and De Soucey 2005: 3). Even though the instructor and some of the participants 
shared a non-Danish ethnic background in this particular group, the asymmetrical power relation 
between the instructor and the participants trumped the shared ethnicity and the bonding that could 
presumably spring from that. Joking is thus not a cure-all treatment for a group. After the joke was 
rejected and fell flat, the instructor tried to rerail the discussion by asking whether the participants 
could provide more examples of peer pressure and blackmailing. They responded that blackmailing 
had basically been their livelihood and one dramatic story of blackmailing others for money, goods 
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or power followed the other. These stories of fairly horrific blackmailing could be seen as the 
participants’ attempts to fend off the discrediting joke on their behalf and thus as soft resistance 
without any repressive consequences from the instructor.  
 
The next example shows how jokes about ethnicity can work well if they spring from the 
participants’ own sense of humour rather than the instructor’s as in the previous example. Often, 
humour is displayed as subtle disruptions or twisting of the instructors’ original point with an 
exercise, which goes relatively unabated in the lesson – that is, the instructor does not have to stop 
or correct the participants in a harsh or strict manner. These disruptions could be understood as 
rebellious humour (Billig 2005) where jokes target the powerful, in this case, the cognitive 
behavioural instructors. The example below of a role-play gone wild shows how frictional 
behaviour plays out as soft resistance to the arbitrary and infantilizing exercise. It is difficult for the 
instructor to address this soft resistance as it is non-violent, non-offensive (to her at least) and fairly 
ambiguous: 
 
The participants are asked to perform a role play based on a moral dilemma involving 
a gas station in a situation of gasoline scarcity as part of a ‘critical thinking exercise’. 
The participants are assigned different roles and Imad is the filling station attendant. 
This role assignment makes Michael exclaim: ‘they have a foreign worker 
[fremmedarbejder] running around and attending to the customers’ needs!’ This 
remark makes everyone laugh, including Imad who plays the part of a non-Danish 
speaking ‘foreign worker’ to perfection by displaying a heavy accent, thus pretending 
not to understand what the customers need. The atmosphere is very loose, full of 
laughter and jokes, and the participants are truly acting out there parts. In the process 
15 
 
of acting, the participants have psychically taken over the classroom; hence, the 
instructor and I are standing up against a wall in the back of the room. The instructor 
seems worried about the unruly situation and she doesn’t seem to find it funny.  
 
The instructor appears to be caught in a dilemma here – is she supposed to laugh when the joke is 
actually quite offensive and the role play has run loose way beyond her intentions? If she laughs, 
she could be seen as agreeing with racial stereotypes, but when she does not laugh, she is excluded 
from the sameness created by the participants. The instructor is outmanoeuvred both physically 
(backed up against the wall) and metaphorically by her inability to respond in an appropriate 
manner. 
 
The failure of a shared sense of humour highlights a blur in the meta-communicational framing 
process that delineates the boundary between seriousness and play (Bateson 1952; Rossel 1981). 
This is seen in cognitive behavioural programmes when otherwise jocular stories are understood as 
underlying signs of ‘criminal thinking’, as in the following examples where thinking exercises are 
subtly ridiculed by the participants. The participants were asked to reflect upon how fast one is 
allowed to drive and who should decide that during a lesson in Cognitive Skills. Jonas argued that it 
is permissible to drive as fast as your own norms and duties dictate. The instructor challenged this 
and asked: 
 
Instructor: What if there is a policeman on duty assigning speed tickets? Wouldn’t you 
be obliged to slow down at that point?  
Jonas: Well, then you have to slow down right before the police officer and then speed 
up again once you’ve passed him.  
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Instructor: You have obligations towards society don’t you?  
Jonas: Well, yeah some people think so …  
Ibrahim: This is why he is in prison! [All participants laugh while the instructor does 
not.]  
The participants were then asked to write a short story based on a photograph of a man standing 
alone in a dark alley. The point of this exercise was to clarify how every participant (and person in 
general) has his own point of view and thus create different stories. A participant, Jonas, wrote a 
story about the man in the ally, who had just committed robbery in a convenience store and was 
now counting the profit: money and cigarettes. Michael also wrote a story in the ‘true crime’ genre, 
which encompassed an outlaw biker who was planning his next robbery. These stories amused the 
other participants, while the instructor suggested that Jonas and Michael had misunderstood the task 
at hand, but she did not prompt them to rewrite their stories. All three examples resulted in laughter 
from the surrounding participants, but left the instructor baffled. These stories or reports of rule-
breaking behaviour do not necessarily reflect that the participants always make ‘criminal choices’ 
(as argued by the programme manuals; see Sjöberg and Windfeldt 2008; Scheel and Sjöberg 2005), 
but perhaps, rather, that the participants are familiar with the point of the exercise and have no 
difficulties in understanding that everyone has their own opinions. They live up the demands of the 
instructor and the programme by writing stories and discussing hypothetical dilemmas, but they do 
so in a manner that corresponds to their own values and experiences. Hence, they creatively, and 
softly, resist to the exercises in a humorous fashion, which serves to create friction, challenge the 
hierarchies and distort the social order, if only temporarily. These actions come to act as soft 
resistance which sometimes plays out in the manner of code-switching (Anderson 2009) as analysed 
below.  
 
17 
 
Humour in the shape of soft resistance and code-switching  
The cognitive behavioural programmes are based upon a cognitive-psychological model of criminal 
conduct that has an explicit focus on thinking styles that control (or do not control) ‘criminal’ 
behaviour. This model seeks to replace what are considered to be rigid and erroneous thinking 
styles with cognitive skills that can increase pro-social behavioural choices. The model aims, in 
particular, to teach ‘criminals’ to reflect better instead of solely reacting, to show better foresight 
and to plan better in relation to future problems, and, in general, to teach them to be more flexible, 
open-minded, reasonable and thoughtful in their behaviour (DfK 2012:9). The embedded 
normativity in the programmes is visible, in the sense that the instructors are promoting certain 
modes of being, certain attitudes, and certain ways of thinking that are seen as superior (Laursen 
2016). However, the instructors’ aim to stop ‘criminal thoughts’ and to guide the participants 
towards a more ‘proper’ or constructive way of thinking and reacting are often humorously 
subverted. The participants use of humour challenges the social and cultural order in the 
programmes when they display cultural and street capital against the ‘rationalized’ and ‘respectable’ 
version of the world which the instructors push forward. 
My contention is that humour in these programmes can be understood as a meta-commentary on the 
course curriculum, content and assignments. This meta-commentary plays out in the shape of what 
Anderson (2009) calls ‘code-switching’. Anderson’s analytical separation of the residents in an 
impoverished neighbourhood of Philadelphia into two categories, ‘decent’ and ‘street’ families, is 
widely known. Despite the apparent rigidness of these categories, these residents do engage in 
‘code-switching’, which means that one ‘[…] may behave according to either set of rules, 
depending on the situation’ (Anderson 2009). Likewise, the participants in cognitive behavioural 
programmes recognise – and are playing with – both the values of their social and ethnic origins 
and those to which they have to conform in order to satisfy the programme instructor, the 
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programme requirements and, in a larger scheme, the prison. The participants often draw upon a 
street-based, subcultural capital (Laursen & Laws 2016), which was also on display when one of the 
participants suggested that ‘you should drink a beer when you are upset’. This suggestion seemed 
sound enough, but another participant quickly answered ‘yeah, but then you end up getting arrested 
because you smashed someone in town’. This response seems to fit the script of a certain inner-city, 
subcultural expectation of night-life, which is estranging to the instructor who suggested that the 
participants should ‘just stay at home’ in order to avoid trouble.  
 
One vernacular for humour and soft resistance in the cognitive behavioural programmes is jocular 
stories or enactments of ‘funny violence’ where the participants code-switch between the normative 
expectations of the programme and of their street-based subcultural experiences. The participants 
were often asked to ‘consider all alternatives’ when confronted with a possible tense or violent 
situation. This request to self-reflect and critically assess the value of one’s own thoughts would 
sometimes result in jokes. For example, one of the instructors asked what the participants could do 
instead of resorting to violence in a tense situation, and the participant Michael replied: ‘well, I 
wouldn’t want to kill him, just stomp on him a little bit’. This witty response could illustrate a 
normative game, in which Michael shows his awareness not only of different cultural codes, but 
also a sophisticated understanding of the dissonance between what might be ‘right’ in some 
contexts and what is acceptable in others. The participants continued to joke and said that ‘a sweaty 
hand and a slap go well together – then it says splash!’ which also resulted in laughter from the 
other participants. After these jocular remarks, the participants returned to the discussion and 
provided more ‘appropriate’ answers to conflict resolution, hence displaying the ability to code-
switch between the ‘proper’ behaviour in different contexts. 
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The next example of an exercise in ‘considering all alternatives’ when faced with a potential 
conflict, illustrates several points of interest, namely the participant Ahmad’s subtle ridicule of the 
exercise and the gap between the worldviews of the instructor and the participants. The instructor 
Mohammad, asked the participants to list suggestions on how to calm down if they become angry. 
After a few suggestions such as ‘smoking cigarettes, being alone and working out’, the participant 
Ahmad exclaimed: ‘I put on a facial mask and listen to Tupac’. Everyone laughed at this point – 
according to the participants, no man would put on a facial mask in order to calm down! Ahmad 
toys with the instructor and the exercise by humorously suggesting that he would put on a facial 
mask (a ‘feminine’ recreational activity) while listening to Tupac (a ‘masculine’ or street-based 
appropriation of ‘proper’ relaxation). Listening to rap music is not deemed a proper or constructive 
relaxation activity by some of the cognitive behavioural instructors (see Laursen & Laws 2016), but 
Ahmad seems to recognize the instructors expectations (that he will choose a ‘wrong’ type of 
relaxation – listening to Tupac) while he simultaneously suggests a ‘decent’ relaxation activity. In 
an attempt to redirect the discussion, the instructor then said that he ‘reads a novel and listens to 
Frank Sinatra’ when he is upset. This made the whole group laugh hard and protest once again: no 
one is able to read when they are upset! Reading and listening to Frank Sinatra did not seem a 
viable solution. This disagreement can also highlight differences in the cultural capital and habitus 
of the instructors and participants, as it seemed completely unrealistic to listen to Frank Sinatra (the 
participants would often suggest listening to Tupac instead) while reading. The appreciation of, 
respectively, Tupac and Sinatra are obviously connected to taste and preferences, or put differently, 
cultural capital (Bourdieu 1990).  
 
As also identified by other researchers (Fox 1999a: 93, 97, 1999b; Lacombe 2008), the cognitive 
behavioural programmes seem to produce particular ‘catch-22’ situations wherein programme 
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instructors, based on the programme ideology, expect a certain ‘anti-social’ behaviour (such as 
using violence; see Crewe 2011: 516). In order to divert or avoid these situations, the participants 
use humour as disruptions of role play and exercises which enables the participants to resist in 
subtle ways that do not call for reprimands. They exercise code-switching in order to accommodate 
the instructor’s need for the ‘right’ type of answers while they simultaneously manage to stay loyal 
to their own world-views. This was on display when the participants in Cognitive Skills acted out a 
role play wherein Irfaan played an angry customer in an auto shop. Irfaan negotiated with the 
mechanic and said that he would pay him extra money if he could have Irfaan’s car repaired by the 
morning, which made Jonas exclaim, ‘that’s bribery!’, while he laughed out loud. Irfaan said, ‘no, 
that’s not bribery, it is a social skill’. Here, Irfaan appears to be knowingly conjoining the norms 
and aims of the course (to acquire ‘social skills’) with a mode of subcultural codes (being ‘street 
smart’). He seems to be referring both seriously and jokingly to a mode of behaviour in which he 
might ordinarily engage. It could also be argued that Irfaan knows and toys with the course’s 
underlying assumptions about the participants’ ‘cognitive deficits’ and, thus, demonstrates the exact 
kind of behaviour that is assumed by the course ideology. Also, the participants use humour to 
transform a supposedly problematic being into an asset; in this case Irfaan portrays himself as 
socially skilled and competent instead of bribing and ‘criminal’. The participants manage to object 
to the embedded ‘cognitive deficit’ lens that their behaviour is understood through by humorously 
negotiating with the premises for identity construction. Jocular gripes and jocular stories of 
masculinity, violence and crime thus serve as soft resistance, which can remedy, or perhaps 
completely fend off, the otherwise ‘forced production of selves’ (Fox 1999: 111) in cognitive 
behavioural programmes. 
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There is a certain esoteric nature in the participants’ shared humour in relation to the sociality and 
inner workings of the prison. This is visible in the following description where the participant 
Patrick displays knowledge of the programme’s requirements while he refers to a shared knowledge 
of the subcultural values and norms of the prison sociality. Patrick told a story of a conflict between 
him and another prisoner where the other prisoner stole something from Patrick’s cell and teased 
Patrick throughout the day. Patrick was furious in the end and wanted to hit the other prisoner. The 
instructor asks, ‘what could you do to solve this in an assertive manner?’ Patrick said, ‘I guess I 
could have told the guards’, which made all the participants laugh out loud. ‘Snitching’ in the shape 
of telling the guard is a well-known sin in prison, regardless of the fact that snitching is actually 
widespread (Copes, Brookman and Brown 2013). Patrick drew upon this subcultural knowledge in 
order to ridicule the exercise and display the absurdity of assertive communication in prison (for a 
similar account, see Fox 1999: 95). However, he also succeeds in displaying knowledge of the 
‘right’ type of behaviour in accordance with the programme and instructors aim of teaching the 
participants to communicate assertively by suggesting that he should have solved the conflict in a 
non-violent manner. This type of frictional behaviour - where Patrick is joking with while 
simultaneously living up to the programme’s expectations - and its relationship to soft power is 
discussed further below. 
 
Humour as frictional behaviour  
As suggested by Rubin (2016), prisoners’ frictional behaviour grants a window of autonomy and 
creates leeway for small but significant acts of agency. Rubin’s (2015: 2) contention is that we 
might theoretically and analytically use acts of friction to gain insight into the limitations of power 
and into the ways frictional behaviour may reverse power dynamics. In this context, frictional 
behaviour creates soft resistance and does, if not reverse, fends off soft power. The participants in 
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cognitive behavioural programmes engage in frictional behaviour, which serves to disrupt the 
lessons and twist the intentions of exercises to a point of near absurdity. This frictional behaviour is 
evident in the following example where the participants in Cognitive Skills were taught how 
commercials are designed to convince us to buy more: 
 
One of the two groups works very seriously with the task and produces a commercial 
for football boots. The second group goes about the task in a humorous fashion and 
there is constant giggling and laughter from their end of the room. The second group 
finally presents the commercial: ‘Your Organic Smoking Shop’ targeted readers of 
‘Gateway to Hope [5]’ and other Danish prisoner magazines. The group has 
developed a new environmentally conscious way of smuggling marihuana into the 
prison by way of a delivery cycle. The slogan for the commercial is ‘You call, we 
throw’ [hinting at the fact that sometimes marihuana is thrown over the prison fence]. 
To add credibility to their commercial, the group has added the testimony of a 
satisfied customer. 
 
As seen in this example, the quixotic and oftentimes infantilizing role play in the programmes is 
ripe for producing jokes, silliness and stilted examples. However, as also found in Fox’s study 
(1999: 445), the participants’ disruptions and soft resistance actually most often revolve around the 
arbitrary format requirements of the programme, such as role play or thinking exercises – not the 
content as such. Nonetheless, the participants seem to keep psychological power and the demands 
for cognitive-self-change at bay by ridiculing the course content. Their soft resistance goes 
unpunished, precisely because it is so difficult for the instructor to identify and object to when the 
frictional behaviour can be explained away as ‘just a joke’.  
23 
 
 
The demand to critically assess of the value of one’s thoughts, actions and choices are prominent in 
the cognitive behavioural programmes. However, there is obviously a difference between a demand 
and obedience, which was clear in an exercise in critical thinking and how to handle defeats where 
the participant Jonas was interpreting the lesson in a humorous fashion. Jonas was supposed to 
think through all possibilities if he were to find it difficult to secure a livelihood upon his release. 
Jonas used a metaphor of his previous effort to open a safety box to get hold of the money inside: 
‘I’ll just keep trying and use different tools. If it doesn’t work with a cutting blowpipe, then I’ll use 
a grinding machine – it will open at some point!’ Bishar chimed in and said ‘I sometimes feel 
defeated when I think about the crimes I am imprisoned for, but then again – there is a difference 
between the amount of crimes I’ve committed and the ones I am convicted for’. Both examples 
resulted in a roar of laughter from the other participants. The point of the exercise was obviously 
not to become a ‘better criminal’, but to find alternatives such as employment or applying for social 
security when the participants find themselves lacking money. However, Jonas seemed to find the 
exercise infantilizing and self-explanatory, so he made fun of it, albeit in a very subtle manner. 
  
Another exercise in ‘critical thinking’ can further prove the point of understanding jokes as 
frictional humour and soft resistance against seemingly ‘silly’ exercises. The participants were 
asked to discuss an example of two parents arguing about their discovery of their daughter’s habit 
of smoking cigarettes from, respectively, the daughter’s and the parents’ points of view. According 
to the instructor, the point of this exercise was to develop and practice ‘critical thinking’ and 
‘efficient decision-making’. Jonas said: ’don’t worry, she just needs a little tobacco to mix with the 
marihuana’, which made all the participants laugh. However, the instructor did not laugh and 
struggled to rerail the discussion; but the participants succeeded in their sabotage of the lesson and 
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the discussion soon died out. The participants were asked to alter their thinking and improve their 
decision-making, but they did not seem to find these purposes, or at least not the means of change, 
relevant for them. Hence, they made fun of the exercise and escaped, if only briefly, the intended 
cognitive self-change.       
 
Another outlet for frictional humour among the participants is sexualized joking. The participants, 
especially younger prisoners, manage to steer many discussions in the direction of tendentious 
topics such as women and sex. During an exercise in critical thinking skills and self-containment in 
Anger Management, the participants were supposed to relate to an example of a football player who 
is about to take a penalty that will determine the outcome of the game. The football player is 
thinking ‘negative thoughts’ and he is sure that he will fail. The participants’ fidgeting, yawns, 
sideways glances and stretches served as signs of their difficulty in engaging in this particular 
exercise. Nevertheless, they began to answer the instructor’s questions about what topics the 
football player should replace his negative train of thoughts with:  
 
Amin: Women.  
Khazar: It depends on what kind of match it is.     
Omar: I cannot really see how I am supposed to stand and think about this in a heated 
situation. I have to try it before I believe it.  
Amin: Just say PEACE! [Everyone, besides the instructor, laughs. The discussion is 
derailed and the instructor changes the topic].  
Instructor: Can anyone summarize today’s lesson?  
Imad: It is normal to be angry and we are not crazy.  
Omar: Don’t we have to do any homework?  
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Amin: You have to listen to that CD, you have to be completely naked while you do it 
and touch yourself all over your body [All participants laugh while the instructor 
seems frustrated.] 
 
This exercise was effectively disrupted by the participants’ humorous horseplay and the instructor 
was forced to move on to another subject after she had unsuccessfully prompted them to take the 
exercise seriously. The young participants pride themselves in having an assertive heterosexuality 
and a ‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu 1990) with young women. The participants joke about their 
capacity for ‘gangster-love’ and how they aim to win female prisoners over with their charm and 
wit. Jokes, innuendos and comments about women or girls were frequently on display, but seemed 
to function as a group-consolidating mechanism and as frictional behaviour rather than actual sexist 
or misogynist intentions (for a different account, see Kehily and Nayak 1997). Tales of female 
conquests also highlight the numerous ways that the participants might seek redemption for their 
(potential) experiences of being emasculated and infantilized qua their imprisonment (Ugelvik 
2011). 
 
Adding to the above, I argue that expressing an active heterosexual identity and success in winning 
women over are important elements of such jocular identity work. Stereotypical or dominant images 
can be redeployed differently or disruptively (Munoz 1999), for instance through bodily resistance: 
tattoos, sexual experiences and physical prowess (Raby 2005: 154). In this vein, humour can 
potentially transform a problematic being into an asset. The remark by Imad (‘it is normal to be 
angry and we are not crazy’) also serves to illustrate a re-narration of a potentially negative self-
image (being crazy) while pushing forward more positive self-images of being capable and skilled. 
The participants and the instructor in Anger Management went on to discuss how the participants 
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experienced the assignment of listening to a relaxation CD every night before they went to sleep. As 
evident in the example below, the participants were more preoccupied with girls than with 
relaxation:   
 
Khazar: It was a bit difficult to listen to the CD because my cellmate was there as 
well. It was more relaxing when I chose the female voice-over ...  
Imad: He can’t relax because he doesn’t have a mermaid! [Girlfriend]  
Omar: Yes! He has tons of mermaids; he is an Iraqi player, an Iraqi ‘John Travolta’! 
[Everyone, besides the instructor, laughs.] 
 
Besides showing a preoccupation with women, this example also shows how disruptive humour can 
be; the participants managed to derail the conversation completely and, thus, forced the instructor to 
change the subject. These types of frictional behaviour and soft resistance seem so prevalent in the 
empirical material that a discussion of the reach of soft power in cognitive behavioural programmes 
has merit.  
 
Conclusion 
Questioning the reach of soft power in prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes 
In this article I have examined the meanings of humour within cognitive behavioural programmes in 
prisons. I have argued that humour in cognitive behavioural programmes can be understood as a 
meta-commentary on the course curriculum and assignments and as frictional behaviour. The 
analytical benefits of a fusion between the concepts of friction and resistance, has led me to suggest 
that we may understand the participants’ behaviour as ‘soft resistance’. My analysis of humour and 
soft power in prison-based cognitive behavioural programmes has shed light on new ways of 
27 
 
understanding the subordination that takes place in these programmes while, importantly, 
illuminating the numerous ways that the participants humorously create friction (Rubin 2015a) by 
resisting and transforming the programmatic goals. 
 
This article also illustrates how different analytical lenses or understandings provide very different 
interpretations of humour. The instructors interpret humour through a ‘deficit’ lens much in 
accordance with their training (for a similar account, see Fox 1999: 93). This means that the 
participants’ use of humour is understood in psychological terms and as confirmations of their 
cognitive distortions. As a supplement to this understanding, this article advances a sociological 
analytical lens and, thus, a different understanding of humour. This perspective allows for an 
interpretation that pays attention to the social nature of humour, the context in which it plays out 
and its use in fending off soft power in prison. The jokes and comments made by the participants in 
cognitive behavioural programmes – however silly, puerile, or chaotic they may appear – could be 
understood as soft resistance in the symbolic struggle against soft power in prison. 
  
This perspective enables an analysis of the ways power works and does not work, or at least is 
disrupted. These sentiments stand in contrast to a Foucauldian understanding of power, which 
implies that power always works – including in productive and positive ways. Humour seems to 
allow the participants in cognitive behavioural programmes to create friction (Rubin 2015) against 
the psychological power imbedded in this type of ‘treatment’, while avoiding serious repercussions. 
In a similar line, Rubin argues that ‘[…] prisoners manifest Levi-Strauss’s (1966) bricoleur, who 
uses whatever materials are at hand’ to create friction (Rubin 2016: 15); here, it is the cognitive 
behavioural programme’s requirements such as role-play and thinking exercises. The previous 
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empirical examples highlight the creativity of the group’s frictional behaviours and the seemingly 
small, but yet significant, symbolic victories that the participants obtain by disrupting the lessons.  
 
However, while the programmes aim at modifying prisoners’ perspectives, the prisoners do not 
readily accept the characterizations assigned to them or the tacit questioning of their moral codes 
(Fox 1999a: 94). The participants do not readily accept the characteristics pushed forward by the 
programme manuals, such as the alleged tendencies to be impulsive, egocentric, rigid in their views, 
and poor at problem-solving, perspective-taking, and critical reasoning (Ross, Fabiano and Ewles 
1988). On the contrary, they pride themselves on being ‘street smart’, and having sexual capacities, 
psychical prowess and understanding of how to manoeuvre in a tense prison setting. This does not 
necessarily imply that they do not internalize the programmatic characteristics at some point and 
thus strive to conduct themselves differently, but we should not readily accept the notion that power 
always works. Perhaps the participants pay lip service to the programmatic goals and go on to live 
their lives as they see fit once they pass the programmes. Humour is indeed an excellent tool against 
power, as seen in satirical cartoons meant to challenge oppressive regimes, jocular remarks directed 
at the powerful or in working class ‘lads’ humour, which works as a defence and counterattack 
against the school culture. These jocular disruptions of power may result in subversion eventually 
(as seen when the ‘lads’ end up reproducing working class selves; Willis 1978), but humour has 
merit and utility as an attempt to delegitimize stereotypes, categorizations and subordinating 
experiences.       
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Notes 
1. In line with many scholars, I use the expression ‘humour’ as ‘an umbrella term to cover all 
categories of the funny’ (Lippit 1994: 147). I understand and analyse humour in its broadest 
sense to include styles of jokes, insults, irony, funny remarks, play and storytelling. 
2. I wish to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pushing me to think about and suggest 
this concept. 
3. 1) The superiority theory (we find humour in the misfortunes of others to the ridicule of 
something or someone), 2) the relief theory as pioneered by Freud (1950) (we laugh to 
release emotional or psychic tension) and 3) the incongruity theory where Kant 
(2008[1790]: 161) defines laughter as ‘an affection arising from the sudden transformation 
of a strained expectation being reduced to nothing’. 
4. In 2013 504 offenders participated in the seven different cognitive-behavioural programs 
offered by the Danish penal services. As approximately 4000 people were imprisoned and 
8000 on probation/under surveillance this year (Annual Report 2013), this may not come 
across as a high number, but since most prisoners are imprisoned for too short sentences to 
engage in training programs, the coverage is actually quite high. 
5. ’Gateway of Hope’ [Håbets port] is a Danish magazine written by and for prisoners and 
distributed in all Danish prisons. 
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